THE Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights has once again called public attention to the discrepancy between American aspiration and accomplishment in race relations.' Housing clearly illustrates the national failure to treat individuals on the basis of individual merit rather than racial myth. In the construction of the twelve million homes required in the next decade to meet America's needs, 2 either present patterns of racial segregation will be perpetuated, or racially integrated housing will be encouraged. Since the course of the law will be a major factor in determining which of these alternative housing patterns develops in the future, it seems imperative to reconsider the basic constitutional issue: to what extent do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit racial discrimination in private or in publicly aided housing? Legal reevaluation is made all the more pressing by the restrictive covenant cases (awaiting decision on the merits for the first time in the Supreme Court), and by the first case involving discrimination in a redevelopment project. The ingredients of a fresh appraisal are a realistic picture of Negro housing in America and a review and critique of the decisions involving discrimination by government or private home owners.
NEGRO HOUSING IN AziERICA
The condition of Negro-occupied residences best illustrates the problem of racial discrimination in housing. All available data demonstrate that Negro homes are substandard, overcrowded, segregated, generally inferior-in every section of the country, and on every income level. 3 In urban areas, for example, a few comparative percentages from an official study indicate the extent of the inferiority: in Hartford, 29.9% of the Negro families as contrasted with 2.5% of the whites lived in dwellings unfit for use or in need of major repairs; in Milwaukee, the corresponding contrast was 67.7% for Negroes to 6.5% for whites; in Detroit, 33.7% and 6.8%; and in Birmingham, 56.5% and 19.7%. 4 Other investigations into the availability of heating, kitchen and toilet facilities, reveal similar racial disparities. 5 Furthermore, overcrowding is characteristic of Negro housing. Before the war, 24% of Negro homes in Philadelphia housed more than one person per 290 (1940) (middle states); JoiwsoN, GROWING Up IN THE BLACK BELT 6, 11, 18, 23, 27, 35, 226 , at 68 quoting a Negro girl in Georgia, "I'd like to have a house that don't leak, a house with no leaks in it anywhere. I wnants a comfortable house, a house you won't freeze in in winter. I'd like to have nice things in the house, nice furniture so you could be comfortable. I'd like for it to have smooth floors, not big loose planks." (1941) In 1940,45% of dwelling units occupied by whites throughout the country were substandard, as against 85% for non-whites. Weaver, Housing in a Democracy, 244 ANN,-.s 95 (1946) . An FHA study found 12.2% of the homes in "white" blocks in need of major repairs, 38.6% in "mixed" blocks, and 50.9% in "non-white" blocks. FHA, THE SRcTURE AND GRoWTH
OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 71 (1939). An official study in Dallas
in the Negro neighborhood is manifest in higher crime rates, and in relatively greater expense to the community in required police, fire and health services. 14 In Chicago's Black Belt, for example, the rate of juvenile delinquency is eight times, and the death rate almost twice that in the rest of the city."' Moreover, through preoc-cupation with segregation, potentially creative energy is wasted by both the majority and minority races. This process of waste is most dramatically illustrated in the race riot. Inferior, segregated housing is one of the primary causes of strained race relations which periodically culminate in race warfare. 16 When the Negro seeks housing outside his segregated area, he is thwarted NEGRO YOUTH AT ThE CROSSWAYS 290 (1940) . Consciousness of discrimination affects Negroes' attitudes towards important social issues, so that even war is looked at from a race rather than from any broader point of view. Id. at xxii. "... . 'Many young Negroes have never experienced the American dream. They have never mown a society compoced of respectable, law-abiding, industrious, self-reliant families whose ambition has been rewarded by good houses, electric refrigerators, and an improved social status." SuTrnvLLD, op. cit. supra (1940). 14. "At least three types of social pathology have been observed to have a high and inescapable correlation with the character of Negro residence areas. These are: (1) A high rate of delinquency, (2) A high rate of mortality, and (3) A distorted standard of living." PREsmENT's CO-FRENCE 52. Rates of "dependency, family desertion and illegitimacy ...
[are] high in those areas that were characterized by physical decay and lack of organized community life." FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAImLY IN THE UNITED STATES 373-4 (1939). A Chicago housing conference "listed among the 'ghetto conditions' high sickness and death rates; a heavy relief load during the Depression; inadequate recreational facilities; lack of building repairs; neglect of garbage disposal and street cleaning; overcrowded schools; high rates of crime and juvenile delinquency; and rough treatment by the police." DRAEM AND CAYTON, BLACK METROOLm 202 (1945) . Segregation can also frustrate the operation of a city plan: "Badly in need of a medical center, express highways, parks and other deferred civic improvements, Detroit must wait indefinitely for them. The land they will occupy now houses hundreds of Negro families who can't be evicted because there's no place for them to go." Velie, Housing: Detroit's Time Bomb, Colliers, Nov. 23, 1946, p (1947) . In a Cincinnati housing project for Negroes, built in the twenties with private funds, the rate of arrest was 1 per 215 inhabitants annually; the rate in the city generally was 1 per 15 for whites and I per 7Y2 for Negroes. PREsmENT's CoN-FERENE 105. 16. LEE, RACE RIOT 60, 89, 93, 119 (1943) analyzes the Detroit riots. Even in the absence of riots, violence is part of the race housing picture. E.g., "From May 1944 through July 1946-a period of twenty-seven months-59 attacks were made on Negro residences in Chicago. About half were arson-bombings. There were 22 cases of stoning, three shootings, three house-wrecklngs, two stench-bombings. Three persons were ldfled and many were injured." GERTz, AMERICAN GHETos 10 (1947) . See also MYRDAL, A, A!auIcu. DILEMMA 624 (1944) ; PRESmENT's CONFERENCE 46; Martin, The Truth About Sojourner Truth, 49 CRISIS 112 (1942) ; BROWN, WHY RACE RIOTS (1944) .
"Anyone who has investigated the problem of group tensions has always ended up by discrimination enforced informally or in the courts. The public housing available to lower income groups includes many segregated projects. 7 In redevelopment housing projects, financed by private investment companies and accommodating lower middle-class tenants, the redevelopment companies' privilege of discrimination has been upheld in an initial court test.' 8 Since these projects, authorized in the past few years in twenty states, 0 may soon become the most significant source of new dwelling units, 20 the decision as to whether they shall be segregated or mixed may be crucial for the establishment of future racial patterns in American housing. In seeking to buy or build a home of his own, the Negro is faced with the restrictive covenant, apparently the most widely used technique for enforcing discrimination in private housing. 866, 701, and 801-4, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 336-42 (1947) . Because of incentives in the form of tax subsidy and use of public authority, redevelopment housing is bound to increase. See notes 55, 57, 60, 61 infra.
21. ". . . Many areas, particularly large cities in the North and West, such as Chicago, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, are widely affected. The amount of land covered by racial restrictions in Chicago has been estimated at 80 per cent. Students of the subject state that virtually all new subdivisions are blanketed by these covenants." Civ. RTs. REP. 68.
In Chicago, estimates of land coverage by covenants have gone as high as 85% and it has been stated that in the entire city there are "only 500 to 600 lots . . . known to be available in any but the worse slum areas upon which housing can be built for Negro occupancy without the use of eminent domain." NAT. URBAN LEAGUE, op. eil. supra note 8, at 16. In Los Angeles, a recent "fever of cases" attests to the extent of covenants, GERTz, AMERICAN GHETTos 6 (1947 ). 22. See, e.g., Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App.2d 230, 146 P.2d 720 (1944 Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932); Janss Investment Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal, 753, 239 Pac. 34 (1925); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919) EcoN. 29,41 (1947) .
25. "For 155 projects in 59 cities having two or more FPHA-aided projects, at least one of which is occupied by Negro tenants, the following results are reported: Collection losses do not exceed one percent of the total operating incomes for a total of 142 of these projects, 72 of which are occupied by Negroes and 70 by white or other tenants. Five of the 13 projects showing rental losses in excess of one per cent are tenanted by Negroes and 8 are tenanted by whites or others. The collection loss records between the two racial groups do not differ more than one per cent in 51 of the 59 cities and the records are identical in who have been given the opportunity to live in modern housing developments. Also, on the assumption that each man gets the full housing value he can pay for, it is frequently argued that Negroes cannot obtain better housing because of inability to pay rather than because of discrimination. But Negro families get less for their housing dollar than white families on the same income level; 2 and, indeed, the relative inferiority actually encreases as the rental value increases.
28 Finally, it is contended that segregation is inevitable because Negroes and whites cannot live together, but this assertion is refuted by a substantial body of evidence on interracial living in federal housing projects. 29 In 325 federal projects providing for occupancy by both Negro and white tenants, the policy ranged from setting 27. "The rent of Negro dwellings is a plain indlication of the exploitation of Negro neighborhoods. These rents are excessive whether they are measured by the kind of house and equipment, by the relation of rents paid by Negroes and those paid by white people for similar quarters, by the steady increase in rents, by the relation of rent to the value of the property, or by the proportion which rent forms of the family budget." WOOFTER, 121 (1928) 20-5 (1947) . For a report of similar experiences in employment see WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR cc.XI, XII (1946) .
NEGRO PROBLEMS IN CITIES
[Vol. 57: 426 aside specific areas for a particular race, to adherence to a principle of no segregation. Harmonious race relations were most thoroughly achieved in those projects which maintained a policy of fully integrating the races, the residents accepting the new neighborhood standard of no segregation in much the same way as they had previously accepted segregation in the communities from which they came."' The extent of the mutual respect engendered by interracial living was demonstrated during the Detroit race riots, when Negroes and whites who had lived together in the same section of the city showed no disposition to join in the general violence.
3 ' An inquiry into this pattern of discrimination should be an integral part of any thorough attack on the legal problems involved in racial segregation. Without an awareness of the implications of each decision in relation to this sociological background, analysis by the courts of the doctrinal issues would appear to be barren indeed. Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947 , the most recent major discussion of the issues currently being posed.
any private rights independent of recognition and protection by government, indicates that "public" and "private" are not separate compartments but titles for opposing ends of a continuous spectrum. 3 " Courts have been faced with the problem of isolating unconstitutional public discrimination from permissible private discrimination in three recurring types of fact situation: action by public officials, by urban redevelopers, and by private agreement.
Segregation by Public Officials
That the legal standard of "separate but equal" facilities is inapplicable in the field of housing and that racial segregation implemented by legislative action comes within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment was determined by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Bitchanan v. Warley3 0 Before the Court was a Louisville ordinance providing that neither white nor colored could purchase or rent property in any block in which the majority of the residents were of the opposite race. Plaintiff, a white man, was seeking specific performance of an executory contract for the sale of real estate from a Negro purchaser who resisted enforcement on the ground that the ordinance made the transfer of clear title impossible. In rendering a decree for the plaintiff, the Court held that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving the parties of their right to buy and sell property and hence was no bar to enforcement of the contract. The Court rejected the "separate but equal" argument employed to sustain the validity of segregation legislation in other fields, such as public transportation and 35. "As a matter of fact, the courts have never been able to establish any fundamental distinction between 'public' and 'private' agencies. They all alike live, move, and have their being in the law. The distinction is largely, or wholly, a matter of custom. That which has generally been considered to be 'public' is 'public,' and that which has generally been considered to be 'private' is 'private' . . . , and what was once considered to be 'private' may later, when conditions change, become 'public'." Barnett, What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L. REv. 227, 229-30 (1945 E. 139 (1915) . One state court in a very strong opinion had invalidated a race ordinance as beyond a municipality's power. State v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914) . For discussion of these cases see MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATus or" Tur NEGRO 139-45 (1940); Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation Ordinances, 33 W.VA. L.Q. 332, 341-9 (1927) .
An even more discriminatory ordinance, which required Chinese to move to a specified area of San Francisco, was invalidated in the early case of In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed, 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890 ).
[Vol. 57: 426 educational facilities, on the theory that since land is a unique commodity it is impossible to provide "equal" housing sites.rr Therefore, the Constitution required that the opportunity to buy and sell land must be freely available to all on a non-discriminatory basis. Finally, it was said that the ordinance could not be justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power!-Two subsequent decisions have extended the anti-segregation doctrine of Buchanan v. Warley. In Harmon v. Tyler,9 the state statute and city ordinance required the consent of a majority of the residents of a particular block or area for the purchase or occupancy of any home by a member of the other race. The possibility of a transfer of property, it as argued, corrected the defect in the Buchanan case, where the express terms of the ordinance made any transfer impossible. If no sale actually took place, it would be not because of the statute but because of the voluntary failure of private citizens to consent. Although the state courts found merit in this distinction, 40 the Supreme Court perceived no difference and unanimously reversed per curiam on the basis of Buchanan v. Warley. Thus, segregation ordinances were unconstitutional despite provision for the voluntary action of private individuals.
In Richmond v. Deans, 4 1 the ordinance provided that no one might purchase or lease property in any block in which the majority of the residents were of such race that there could be no marriage between them and the potential occupant. It was hoped that segregation in housing might be ac- 38. "That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of race hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a measure of consideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges." Id. at 80-1.
• There has been some criticism of the decision on the ground that the Court did not properly weigh the reasonableness of the legislative action as a means of achieving a possible public benefit. cepted as merely a reasonable method of enforcing the miscegenation laws which had been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 42 However, the Supreme Court, in another unanimous per curiam decision citing Bu.
chanan v. Warley, invalidated the ordinance. Thus, segregation in housing was not to be excused by being tied to an approved public policy.
43
Despite this clearly established constitutional prohibition, racial segregation exists through government action in public housing today. There are many more federally-aided locally-administered projects restricted to one race than open to both. 44 Many more Negroes live in segregated than in racially integrated projects. 45 However, the Public Housing Administration has pioneered in establishing projects which eschew race discrimination, and the Negro has more than his population-ratio share of public housing.
4 1
In the case of the Federal Housing Authority which underwrites loans for building or remodelling private homes, discrimination against Negroes has apparently been practiced through informal pressures on banks and other private lenders. [Vol. 57: 426
RACE DISCRIMINA TION IN HOUSING
which seemingly encouraged race covenants. While this provision has recently been revised, the altered phraseology appears inadequate to require any change in policy. 4 s It has been suggested that FHA operations have resulted not only in the maintenance but even in the extension of race restrictive covenants. 49 Thus segregation in housing is apparently being accomplished through administrative action despite Supreme Court decisions prohibiting residential segregation through government action.
Segregation by Urban Redevelopers
Urban redevelopment housing, for which neither the label "public" nor "private" is wholly appropriate, presents a unique legal problem. A major purpose of the redevelopment laws is to insure that the housing which replaces the slum buildings of central blighted areas be constructed as far as possible by private enterprise.6 0 To this end the laws provide for a partnership of public authority and private capital, and define the duties and benefits of each of the partners. 5 1 Illustrative of the race issue in this new type of housing is the New York litigation over Stuyvesant Town, the first largescale postwar housing development ready for occupancy. The constitutional status of Stuyvesant Town can be determined through analysis of the purposes of the New York Redevelopment Companies Law and the interrelationship between municipality and redevelopment project which the law made possible. 5 2 The New York statute provides that "the public interest requires the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and neighborhood rehabilitation" of slum areas. 53 Twin purposes of the statute are slum clearance and moderate rental housing. To fulfill these purposes Now York City, under authority of the state statute, entered into a contract with Stuyvesant Town and its parent organization, Metropolitan Life Insurance CoP 4 The city contracted to use its eminent domain powers to condemn all buildings in a blighted area of 18 square blocks for transfer and sale to Stuyvesant Town. 55 Condemnation proceedings forced some 3,000 families to leave the area. 5 " Since the statute defined the project as a "superior public use," even a public school was levelled at the request of Stuyvesant Town. 5 7 Further, the city ceded 11 acres of public streets to the proj- Laws 1943, c. 234, § 20 . Under the provisions of this section no building was sufficiently important to the public to escape the condemnation process. The result of condemning the public school is to force every child in the project to travel to schools outside the area. Transcript of Hearings 25.
Compar
[Vol. 57: 426 ect 58 and granted it the power to police the development area with a private police force.
5 9 Finally, the redevelopment project was granted a partial tax exemption of $50,000,000 over a period of 25 yearsS 9 In return, Stuyvesant Town contracted to erect a project to house 9,000 families, and submitted to governmental controls, including a 6% limitation on dividends 61 and maintenance of moderate rent ceilings so long as it accepted the tax subsidy. 59. According to Stuyvesant's interpretation of the contract all streets in its area were to be plainly marked "private." The only person permitted to enter %ithout permission would be the City Comptroller who was to have the right to check the financial records periodically. Police, fire, playground services, etc., are all to be under themanagementand control of the private corporation. Contract § § 208, 211,506.
60. The corporation receives tax exemption for 25 years on the difference in value of the area before condemnation and the value of the new project. This involves a charge of $24 over the 25 year period for every family in New York City. A number of housing critics attacked the project as a superior slum which would cost the city far more than it was worth. ABRA.xs, THE FuTuRE oF HousiNG 321-2, 379 (1946) (p. 2 of Answer). However, it claimed "the usual powers of management vested in every THE YALE LAW JOURNAL injunction the court relied on the two main arguments advanced by Metropolitan: first, that the public use and purpose was achieved when the new buildings had replaced the slum tenements; second, that legislative intent had been against limitation of the redevelopment company's managerial discretion in the selection of tenants. Thus, the project was held to be public until the time for occupancy; thereafter it was private and might establish a policy of racial exclusion. 65 The result of the decision was to confirm Metropolitan's thesis that the proper legal status of Stuyvesant Town is that of a private home owner with an apartment to rent. Assuming that the court's interpretation of statutory purpose cl and intent " is correct, the Stuyvesant Town opinion fails to meet squarely the basic constitutional issue created by such an interpretation. May a statute authorize such extensive state action-condemnation of 18 square blocks, displacement of 3,000 families, tax subsidy of $50,000,000, gift of 11 acres private corporation which owns and operates a private housing development, including the ,right to select tenants of its own choice." (p. 5 of Answer).
65. 66. The opinion construed the purpose of the statute in a narrow physical sense. In holding that the statutory purpose was accomplished at the moment the buildings were constructed, the court ignored the broad implications of "neighborhood rehabilitation" required by the act. That the objective was to clear slums and provide for the housing needs of lower middle-class income groups is manifest in the continuing controls which the city maintains over the project. See note 62 supra.
67. Legislative intent was inferred from the following facts: (1) The State Constitutional CoAvention of 1938 refused to include a prohibition against discrimination, whenever state power and money were used, in the Housing Amendment (N.Y. CoNsT. ART. xvi::).
Const. Cony. of 1938: Cony. Pr. Nos. 10, 18, 49, 203, 380, 625, 691. (2) While N.Y. PUnLIC HousING LAw § 223 prohibits discrimination in all projects which are wholly public, the legislature has consistently refused to consider amendments to the Redevelopment Companies Law which would affirmatively forbid discrimination in redevelopment projects, On numerous occasions bills to accomplish this purpose were buried in committee: 1944 Assem. Pr. Nos. 29, 416, 1321 , 1469 , 1996 .Assem. Pr. No, 1885 1947 Assem. Pr. No. 34 . From the legislature's refusal to act against discrimination in redevelopment projects, the court inferred an affirmative intent to permit discrimination. If the court had followed the techniques of statutory construction utilized in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944) , it might well have inferred an opposite intent. See notes 69, 70 infra.
Metropolitan Life contended that without the power to discriminate it would not have invested the funds of its shareholders, since to so do would involve great financial hazard (Affidavit of Mr. Frederick Ecker, Pres., Board of Directors, Metropolitan Life, July 9, 1947). However, this statement is contradicted by the fact that Metropolitan contracted to build the Riverton project soon after New York City passed an ordinance barring segregation in tax exempt projects (Ami. CODE N.Y.C. § J41-1.2, July 3, 1944 (Vol. 57:-426 of city property, surrender of municipal police power-in behalf of a private enterprise which intends to pursue a policy of racial exclusion? Stated differently, the issue is whether a redevelopment project, even though operated for private profit, is the kind of enterprise which must abide by a public standard.
That constitutional questions may arise when discrimination is practiced by an organization functioning under a statute was recognized by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville .R. RP Although the Court, in finding that the Railway Labor Act forbids anti-Negro discrimination by theRailway Brotherhoods, was not compelled to resolve the constitutional issue,1 9 Justice Murphy declared by way of concurrence that if the Labor Act did not forbid such discrimination, it would be unconstitutional under the['Fifth Amendment." Extending the Steele case, a recent Kansas decision not only enjoined discrimination in bargaining but also ordered the union to grant full membership to Negro railway workers 7 Thus, the scope of "public" action was enlarged in order to prevent discrimination by a "private" organization; the position of Stuyvesant Town seems closely analogous.
Moreover, a constitutional issue similar to the issue not discussed in the Stuyvesant Town opinion was resolved by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwrigh1t. 72 The denial by a political party of the right of a Negro to vote in its primary was held unconstitutional because the party was considered a "state agency." 73 Since the political party was subject to legislative controls and had received legislative benefits, the party had to act in accordance with the constitutional standard required of the legislature, the ultimate 68. 323 U.S. 192 (1944) . 69. "If, as the state court has held, the Act confers this power [to discriminate] on the bargaining representative .. .without any commensurate statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. . . .But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft ... did not intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing any duty to protect the minority." Id.
at 198-9.
70. "The Act contains no language which directs the manner in which the bargaining representative shall perform its duties. But it cannot be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 903, 906 (1946) an injunction was granted against a closed shop agreement obtained by a union which practiced segregation: "The public interest is directly involved because the unions are seeking to control by arbitrary selection the fundamental right to work... although such a labor monopoly is not in itself improper, it carries with it certain responsibilities, and the public dearly has an interest in preventing any abuse of it." 72. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). source of its authority. Since the state legislature could not discriminate on a racial basis, its instrumentality was similarly enjoined.
The similarity between the Allwright situation and the administration of redevelopment projects such as Stuyvesant Town seems clear. Taking a broad view of the nature of a "state agency," the Court recognized in the former case that suffrage is a matter of such importance that a minimum of state regulation is sufficient to alter the constitutional status of a private organization. It would seem that housing is no less important than the right to vote.
7 4 The quantum of governmental regulation of Stuyvesant Town appears far greater than its counterpart in the Allwright case. While it seems probable that the political party could function satisfactorily without legislative controls and benefits, 75 Stuyvesant Town could never have been realized without the public aid and power extended by legislation. 6 Since state action was an essential element in the creation of Stuyvesant Town, it would seem that the entire enterprise might be considered an instrumentality of the state and thus subject to the constitutional standard required of government itself. To decide otherwise means that a private project can have the benefits of public subsidy and power, together with the privilege of race discrimination.
Perhaps the most suggestive analogy to the Stuyvesant Town case is
Marsh v. Alabama, in which the property rights of a company town were held subservient to basic rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. There the Supreme Court held that a privately owned town could not prevent the dissemination of religious literature. While in this decision only religious and political liberty were protected, the decision would appear most logically to require company towns to abide by all the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the equal protection clause. In effect, Stuyvesant Town is similar to a company town. 7 1 In the area it covers Stuyvesant 74. "Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present." Holmes, J., upholding the Rent Control Act of 1919 for the District of Columbia, in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) .
75. Following the decision in the Allwright case, South Carolina repealed all state statutes which regulated the conduct of political parties and primaries. Nonetheless, in Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (D.S.C. 1947) , the court still treated the Democratic party as a state instrumentality and ordered the party to enroll Negroes and permit them to vote in the primaries.
76. See pp. 438-9 supra. 77. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) . See pp. 453-4infra for a more detailed interpretation of the case. 78. Another suggestive analogy to redevelopment housing is the public utility. The characteristics which distinguish public utilities from other private enterprises are first, that they are in a monopoly or near monopoly position with regard to control over a vital service, second, that they are in this position because of governmental action or acquiescence; and third, that they are so affected with the public interest as to require the application of a non-private standard. Thus, the courts would surely enjoin an electric company from refusing its services on purely racial grounds. Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. of Indianapolis, 46 F. Town is responsible for police protection, and makes such vital decisions as whether there shall be a school or library. In short, it establishes the cultural environment for a community of 9,000 families. Since Stuyvesant Town has assumed much of the character of government, standing in a relation to New York City similar to that of the company town in relation to its state government, its status as a private government would appear to impose on it constitutional obligations. Among these obligations would seem to be the requirement that the housing development open its doors to tenants on a non-racial basisZ 9 Without such a requirement, the validity of the contract between the city and Metropolitan is open to constitutional attack3P Since the Board of Estimate voted for the contract in spite of clear notice of Stuyvesant's intent to discriminate, it would be difficult to argue that the discrimination was only an incidental by-product of the redevelopment agreement.
8 ' Having entered into the agreement with knowledge of Stuyvesant's policy of racial exclusion, the city would seem to have effected racial zoning for a specific area by contract. To hold such a contract invalid, it is only necessary to cite Harmon v. Tyler, which declared unconstitutional an ordinance that, in effect, granted private home owners the power to zone racially. 82 Whatever the means employed, whether the Board of Estimate votes for an ordinance or a contract, municipal action resulting in racial zoning seems a denial of equal protection. 
See Transcript of Hearings (passim).
In the course of the Hearings witness after witness charged that Metropolitan Life intended to discriminate and hence recommended that the Board of Estimate vote against the redevelopment agreement. Commiioner of Parks Moses defended the corporation's right to discriminate. Transcripi of Hearings 9-10. In voting in the negative Newbold Morris stated his reason as follows: "Therefore, because I care more about the principle than I do about the project, because I cannot vote for public aid and public sponsorship of a private project, whose officers state with candor that racial consideration will enter into the selection of tenants, I cast the three votes of my office in the negative." The final vote was II to 5 in favor of the contract.
82. 273 U.S. 668 (1927) . See p. 435 supra. In the Stu)Tesant Town case the City accomplished this result by contract, granting the power to exclude racially to the Board of Directors of the redevelopment company. opinion as to the intent of the New York Legislature is accepted, the statute would appear unconstitutional. 8 3 Alternatively, a constitutional intent may be assumed, but the contract between the city and Stuyvesant Town may still be declared invalid on the ground that the municipality, an agency of the state, acted in aid of discrimination. 8 4 Finally, Stuyvesant Town itself may be treated as an instrumentality of the state. The statute and the contract may be considered constitutional, but the discriminatory conduct of the "state agency" enjoined. Since the project is almost completed, practical considerations would call for the last approach.
In contrast with New York State practice, Pennsylvania legislation governing urban redevelopment projects provides positive assurance that on completion such projects will be open to members of all races equally. Utilizing the covenant device in reverse, the Pennsylvania statute requires that all redevelopment contracts between cities and private redevelopers include "a covenant running with the land to the effect that no person shall be deprived of the right to live in the redevelopment project . . . by reason of race, color, or national origin.
, 85 
Segregation by Private Agreement
The most widely used legal device for accomplishing race segregation in housing is the restrictive covenant, a mutual agreement among land owners not to sell the restricted property to, nor to allow its use by, members of designated races 8 Typically, the covenants cover an entire subdivision or 83. Under the doctrine of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the statute could be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, although neutral on its face, it was adminigs tered in such a way as to deny the law's equal protection to Negroes. A fortiori, this result must follow if the legislature intended to distribute the housing benefits of urban redevelop. merit on a racial basis. 84. The same court which decided the Stuyvesant Town case denied a taxpayer's suit brought to enjoin the city from granting Metropolitan the tax benefits called for by the contract. See note 80 supra. Both cases have been appealed and will probably be heard by tile Appellate Division in February or March, 1948 The typical restrictive covenant case has the following steps: sale of a home in a restricted area to a Negro, occupancy, suit in equity by a neighbor seeking specific performance of the covenant. Unless there has been some technical defect in the covenant, 9 the courts will force the Negro to move. Change in circumstance is the usual ground for non-enforcement, but the change must be "radical," 90 and some courts insist that the change be in property covered by the covenants rather than the surrounding property, 0 ' a requirement that seems almost impossible to fulfill.
Cases now awaiting decision by the Supreme Court illustrate the typical settings of restrictive covenant litigation. In each case a white vendor was enjoined from transfering or a Negro purchaser from occupying covenanted property. (Vol. 57 : 426 rationale is that the law should enforce private agreements where there is no contrary policy.
An argument frequently made against the enforceability of restrictive covenants is that they impose unreasonable restraints on alienation. lc In the absence of judicial action, official committees appointed by Presidents Hoover and Truman both recommended legislation barring restrictive covenants. PRESwEasT's CONFERENcE 115; Civ. RTs. REP. 169. That the legislature has the constitutional power to enact such legislation seems clear in the light of the modifications of private property rights upheld in the use zoning cases, and in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945) . The initial attempt to enact anti-covenant legislation was apparently the amendment propos-ed last year to the Denver City Charter. This amendment wvas defeated by a close vote in committee. Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 9, 1947, p. 5, col. 4. In action by a city rather than a state, the primary legal problem is whether a municipality has sufficient power delegated from a state. In the case of Denver, the home rule provisions of the state constitution appear broad enough to sustain city action. COLO. Coxsr. Art. XX, § 1; cf. McCormick N. Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P. 2d 969 (1939) .
100. "Under this restriction a purchaser, in order to ascertain whether he was competent to take title, would have to trace back his lineage and ascertain if any, even to the remotest degree, he had in his veins the blood of any of the restricted classes of persons named, which, I am afraid, would be impossible for the most of us.. . . If this restriction is valid, then one which excluded as well those of English, Irish, Scotch, German, French or Swedish descent would as well be valid. Is it possible that such a restriction in a deed could be a valid one? We can reach no other conclusion than that the restriction in this deed is an unreasonable restraint of alienation, against public policy and void." Ellsworth v. Stewart, 9 Erie County L. J. 305, 311 (Pa. 1928) . For discussions of the property doctrines, see Bowman, The Con-few courts have accepted this argument to the extent of refusing to enforce covenants against sale while sanctioning covenants against use and occupancy.' Since it is unlikely that a Negro would buy property on which neither he nor his race can live, a covenant against use and occupancy seems just as effective a restraint as a covenant against sale. Such a distinction thus appears unrealistic. 1 2 However, most courts dismiss the argument that race covenants involve unreasonable restraints on alienation by analogizing them to other restrictive covenants,such as those against certain architectural types and industrial use. Both types, it is argued, equally reflect private property rights, However, the obvious difference between restrictions on land use and restrictions against racial occupancy makes this rationale seem meaningless. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions upholding zoning ordinances based on land use but invalidating those based on racial occupancy renders the rationale untenable. The chief argument urged in the current cases against race covenants is that their judicial enforcement violates the Federal Constitution. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley 104 has been considered by the great majority of state opinions as foreclosing 'this attack, actually the issue was not decided by the Court. The defendants who were enjoined from selling and accepting title to the covenanted District of Columbia property argued only that the covenant per se was unconstitutional. In affirming the injunctive decree, the Supreme Court thus only decided that the signing of covenants was not interdicted by the Constitution. R v. 5, 6 (1945) , esp. at 9 n.17. 101. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S,E, 531 (1929); cf. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Att. 330 (1938) .
In the only case found which deals with the definition of "occupancy," it was held that there was no violation of a racial covenant in the state's building a fishing site to be open to all members of the public. the contention that state action was involved in the plaintiff's involdng the aid of a court to give effect to the covenant was not raised until the case was before the Supreme Court, the Court refused to consider the argument and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Although there is a brief indication that its view on this issue might have been aderse to the defendants, l c 5 the Court concluded with a clear declaration that it had not considered the merits of the court enforcement issue. 0 7 Moreover, since the case arose in the District of Columbia and thus could involve only the Fifth Amendment, it adjudicated nothing concerning the applicability of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."S The issue is thus open for a fresh legal appraisal. There is evidence indicating that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendtheir own property; and there is no color whatever for the contention that they render the inde ture void." 271 U.S. at 329-30 (emphasis added).
106. "And, while it was further urged in this Court that the decrees of tie courts below in themselves deprived the defendants of their liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, tiis contention likewi e cannot serve as a jurisdictional basis for the appeal. Assuming that such a contention, if of a substantial character, might have constituted ground for an appeal under paragraph 3 of the Code provision, it was not raised by the petition for the appeal or by any assignment of error, either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court; and it li.ewise is laching in substance." 271 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
107. ". . . we cannot determine upon the merits the contentions ... that the indenture is not only void because contrary to public policy, but is also of such a discriminatory character that a court of equity will not lend its aid by enforcing the specific performance of the covenant .. .the appeal must be, and is Dismissedfor want ofjurisdiclion." Id. at 332. C. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936) . For discussion of whether the District is a "state" for other purposes, see Notes, 55 YAL L. J. 600 (1946); 46 CoL. L. REv. 125 (1946); FederalLegislation, 29 GEo. L. J. 193 (1940 The General Counsel of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, a consistent defender of race covenants, in a letter of May 4, 1927, wrote, "The objection that such restrictions are of such a discriminatory character that a court of equity vill not aid was raised in the Corrigan case but was not decided."
Although Doherty v. Rice, 240 W',is. 389, 396-7, 3 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1942) refers to the ment conceived it as an effective weapon against any state aid to discrimination, apparently including discrimination by groups or individuals. 10 Civil rights legislation enacted to implement this wide anti-discrimination purpose, although in part subsequently declared unconstitutional,"' seems a further indication that the legislators of the reconstruction period held no narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Still in effect is a civil rights act providing that: "All citizens . . . shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 112 Although this statute has not been given serious consideration in state court covenant opinions,' it seems to reflect an anti-discrimination doctrine comprehensive enough to include restrictive covenants. REV. 19, 35-6, 75, 79 (1938) ; Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amend. ment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 381, 387-8, 401-3 (1938) . See also Appendix to dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 , 1684 ,1696 (1947 113. The most likely explanation is that these courts have applied here also the broad interpretation of "private" action they have read into the Fourteenth Amendment. In terms of precedent this is a paradoxical view because the Supreme Court decision cited to sustain this view, the Civil Rights Cases, apparently made an express exception for this statute. "An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold properly, to buy and sell, to sue in the Courts, or to be a witness or a juror, . . ." except under some state action, which would be unconstitutional, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (emphasis added). This statute was cited in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917) . Recently it has been revived in Oyama v. California, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 4108 (U. S. Jan. 20, 1948) , and in two state decisions. State v. Ikeda, 61 Ariz. 41, 143 P.2d 880 (1943) (requirement that dealings with Japanese-Americans be publicized held a violation of the statute); Crist v. Henshaw, 163 P.2d 214 (Okla. 1945) (sale of land to Negro, even in white neighborhood, cannot be a "nuisance," in face of Civil Rights Act).
114. "Since the injunctions are based on covenants alone and the covenants are based on color alone, ultimately the injunctions are based on color alone. Even if they were based on color in combination with other factors they would still violate the Act. Tile Act prohibits injunctions which depend in any degree upon the fact that the persons enjoined are colored, for any restriction which is imposed upon the right of colored citizens to purchase and hold property and would not be imposed upon the right of white citizens to purchase and hold the same property denies to colored citizens 'the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. ' " Edgerton, J., dissenting, Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d at 241 (App. D.C. 1947 ). 115. 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892 ).
[Vol. 57: 426 enants, where a United States circuit court concluded, as an alternative ground of decision,"' 6 that to regard the enforcement of race covenants as not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment would be to give too narrow a scope to the Amendment's broad sweep. 17 Moreover, on the basis of this policy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment, two recent Los Angeles municipal court decisions have denied enforcement of race restrictive covenants." 8 There is thus some judicial authority that the non-discrimination conception embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment is broad enough to include restrictive covenants within its purview. Doctiinally, to bring the broad prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments into play in a specific case, it must be shown that judicial enforcement or restrictive covenants involves action which is both discriminatory and public." 9 Some courts have denied that enforcement of covenants is discriminatory on the ground that any group may invoke judicial aid in enforcing covenants. " 0 However, in the light of the sociological data already 116. Besides the violation of the Amendment, Judge Ross cited public policy, and a treaty with China, which granted its nationals in this country the same right as those of citizens of the most favored nation, as grounds for refusing to enforce a covenant against Chinese. Id. at 182-3. For a brief discussion of the legal argument against covenants which may be based on the treaty ground, see note 136 infra. 117. "It would be a very narrow construction of the constitutional amendment in question and of the decisions based upon it, and a very restricted application of the broad principies upon which both the amendment and the decisions proceed, to hold that, while states and municipal legislatures are forbidden to discriminate against the Chinese in their legislation, a citizen of the state may lawfully do so by contract, which the courts may enforce." Id. at 182.
118. Anderson v. Auseth, Los Angeles Superior Court, No. 48408, Dec. 6, 1945 . The second case is reported in Chicago Defender, Nov. 1, 1947, p. 1, col. 8.
119. The accepted view, requiring the "public" element, appears, in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, to be based on the word "state" in the Amendment. As for the Fifth Amendment, the only Supreme Court decision squarely holding that the action of private groups and individuals is not included is Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). See note 105 supra. This requirement of "public" has led to procedural difficulties in suits against indiridual officials of the state and federal government. The doctrine involved requires ".... the fiction that the suit must be one against an officer as an indiridual to escape the bar of sovereign immunity." Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sorereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 1060, 1079 (1946) (emphasis added). But " .. the officer in proceeding under such [unconstitutionall enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that [Federal] Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and subjected in his person to the consequences of his indiridual conduct." Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (emphasis added). Although the Constitution does not provide a remedy for the violation by individuals of the rights it protects, such violation may state a cause of action. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (federal court has jurisdiction in suit grounded on violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendments). Thus, it might be possible to say that covenants are unconstitutional even before application to the courls for their enforcement. This reasoning illustrates the difficulties involved in attempting a rigid "private"--"public" compartementalization.
120. E.g.: "Under similar circumstances the remedy granted here is equally available to all litigants, regardless of race, or color." Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 515, presented, this view "amounts to saying that if Negroes are excluded from decent housing they may retaliate by excluding whites from slums." 121 Since Negroes are specifically rlamed in the typical covenant and therefore excluded solely because of race, it would seem that judicial enforcement of covenants is by any common-sense standard discriminatory.
2
Assuming that covenants are discriminatory, one must further show that their enforcement by the courts involves public action. Since the judiciary is a co-equal branch of our traditional tri-partite form of government, judicial action would seem to be no less public than that of the legislature or executive. And it is well established that in supervising the procedural conduct of litigation,' 2 ' interpreting the common law,' 2 4 and rendering equitable decrees, 125 the courts are subject to the constitutional interdictions directed towards governmental action in general.' = G Since in the typical covenant case, the courts are interpreting the common law and rendering equitable decrees, it would seem that their action in such cases is public action and thus within the scope of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Marsh v. Alabama, 27 moreover, the Supreme Court extended previous notions as to what was embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment. In reversing a conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for trespassing in violation of company regulation on the private property of a company town, the Court appears to have held either the conviction by the state court, or the regulation of the company, to be "public" action within the meaning of the Constitution. 1 2s If the former was the ground, an analogy to the covenant situation is suggested. It would seem that a state court decree enforcing a discriminatory covenant is as much "state" action as a state court decree which deprives one Jehovah's Witness of her religious freedom. If the company regulation was the ground on which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied, a further argument is suggested. In developing its position that the actions of a company town were circumscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court suggested by way of dictum that private land owners together could not so group their property rights as to take action contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 2 In many residential real estate subdivi-sions, streets are platted, sewers and water mains laid out and the entire area developed by private subdividers in a manner similar to that of a municipal government. Where restrictive covenants cover such subdivisions 30 it would seem that they might be considered subject to the interdictions of the Fourteenth Amendment as visualized in the Marsh case dictum.
Moreover, since restrictive covenants typically cover entire residential areas, as appears the fact in all of the cases now pending before the Supreme Court,' their effect is functionally equivalent to that of a racial zoning ordinance. Where covenants do not presently cover entire areas, experience shows that, if encouraged by court enforcement, covenants do in time cover all of the area available for desirable residences. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946 ), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1751 (1947 . As to the District of Columbia background for the Hurd case, consider: "The chief weapon in tile effort to keep Negroes from moving out of overcrowded quarters into white neighborhoods is the restrictive covenant. New building sites and many other areas are now covenanted. ... Even where covenants do not prevail, the powerful local real estate fraternity protects white areas from 'invasion.' The all-white Washington Real Estate Board has a "code of ethics' which prohibits its members from selling land in predominantly white areas to Negroes, and the realtors are supported in this practice by non-member dealers, banks, and loan companies." Civ. RTs. REi. 91-2. In Detroit, the city involved in tile Sipes case, 80% of residential areas, excluding those old and settled, is covered by restrictive covenants. BLACK, PATTERNS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS (unpublished thesis, Wayne University, 1948) . For the background of the Shelley case, see Note, 3 NAT. BAR J. 50 (1945) .
132. That judges should rule on the basis of such experience was well expressed by Justice Jackson in a recent patent case. "...
It is immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at tile goal before condemning the direction of the movement." Int'l Salt Co. v. U. S., 68 Sup. Ct. 12, 15 (1947 
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSIAG
argument that racial zoning ordinances were primarily a valid exercise of the police power or in aid of some lawful public policy and only secondarily effectuating segregation was rejected by the Supreme Court in the ordinance cases. 35 In Harmon v. Tyler, it was contended that since a majority of landowners could permit sales to Negroes the ordinance was primarily in aid of private agreement. This was considered too flimsy an argument to warrant consideration.
An additional argument against race covenant enforcement is our international commitment under the United Nations Charter.'e : The Charter binds its signatories to grant full rights to all individuals regardless of race. 135. See pp. 434-6 supra. The Deans case was cited recently for the proposition urged in the text: "The effect of racial discrimination is not avoided by basing it ostensiby on some other factor.... So here discrimination against Negro employees cannot be sustained merely because it purports to be based on promotability, which is itself based on race. Rsv. 477,481 (1946) .
137. CHARTER OF THE UrTEiD NATiONS, Art. 55(c) provides: "... the United Nations shall promote: .. .universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." In Art. 56, "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Language almost identical with Art. 55(c) appears in the Preamble; Art. 1(3) (purposes); Art. 13(l)(b)(duties of General Assembly); Art. 62(2)(duties of Economic and Social Council); and Art. 76(c) (trusteeship system).
138. [1945] There are obvious inconsistencies in a nation's binding itself to the United Nations Charter while at the same time lending its aid to the enforcement of racial covenants.
The constitutionality of the enforcement of restrictive covenants is still an open issue, but a realistic appraisal of their court-aided effect indicates that their enforcement is prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 141 As was said by the court in Gandolfo v. Hartman, "Any result inhibited by the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of individual citizens than by legislation, and the courts should no more enforce the one than the other. This would seem to be very clear." 142 
CONCLUSION
Although there is no easy or automatic solution to the problem of what is "public" and what is "private" discriminatory action, 143 it would seem that pragmatic view must recognize as public discriminatory action within the meaning of the constitutional proscription. In both cases, the participation by public officials in the discrimination is substantial, and the social interest in promoting non-discriminatory patterns appears to outweigh the considerations supporting the individual contractual freedom to segregate, relied on by Metropolitan Life and the restrictive covenantors. 1 1 4 The increasingly pluralistic nature of our democratic society suggests that individual civil rights today depend in many instances on the policies of groups that would traditionally have been considered private. If the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are to continue to serve a significant protective function, it would seem that their scope must be enlarged to encompass the activities of modem political and economic institutions.
The forthcoming clarification by the Supreme Court of the criteria applicable to cases involving discrimination in housing will inevitably affect the pattern of future American living. Should the Court declare that race covenants may not be enforced, substantial changes in race-residential boundaries would seem an inevitable result. Fuhthermore, the rationale would pre- It is to be noted that action by public officials may vary from close regulation as instanced by a public utility, to the discretionary revoking or granting of licenses and corporate charters. The argument that corporations receive sufficient state support to come within constitutional standards was considered and rejected by the court in a recent covenant case, Northwest Civic Ass'n v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 NAV.2d 36 (1947) , the court recognizing no differences between individual and corporation; but see Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) for the suggestion that a state may enforce, in the field of race segregation, a policy for corporations different from that for individuals.
At the other extreme of the spectrum is action not in fact involving any participation by public officials, e.g., the choice of dinner guests. Any uninvited guest-a trespasser-is subject to police and court action. Stuch state action, presumably applied to all equally wi1hout regard to color, creed or rat ionallty, is not within the scope of this discussion. But what if the owner attests that he objects only to Negro trespassers? Can the state properly protect this selective use of property?
144. Such balancing of the public interest against the rights of private individuals seems to have been an important factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946) . "The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not almays mean absolute dominion ....
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here . 
